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ABSTRACT This paper explores Unamuno’s narrative fictions as thought experiments 
regarding the self and the emotions. It begins by developing a notion of thought experiment 
consequent with his understanding of philosophy as a form of literature. Next, it focusses on 
the philosophy of the emotions implicit in his major essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida. 
The third section offers a case study in the form of envy in the novel Abel Sánchez. The final 
section addresses different forms of knowledge about the emotions conveyed by Unamuno’s 
fictional works.   
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1. Literature as Thought Experiment in Unamuno 
This paper provides a novel interpretation of Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936), framing him 
as a thinker who developed a philosophy of the emotions in literary form.1 Besides his major 
essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida where he sketches his core ideas about affectivity, it 
was in his narrative fictions (novels, novellas, short stories, dramas, etc.) where he neatly 
addressed questions concerning the human heart. According to Unamuno, rather than being 
appraised from a hypothetical view from nowhere, emotions are better understood as embedded 
in their specific contexts, and engaged in the wider complexities of human condition. As I will 
argue in this paper, the Spanish writer uses narrative fictions in order to raise and scrutinize 
essential questions about self and emotion – providing us with new insights into the nature of 
human affectivity. 
 For the development of my argument, I will depart from an idea already formulated in 
Julián Marías’s influential book Miguel de Unamuno, which holds that Unamuno’s novels 
should be regarded as a “method for obtaining knowledge”.2 In putting us in contact with a 
concrete aspect of life, Unamuno’s narrative fiction constitutes a first step towards an existential 
analysis or an ontological study of existence (Marías, p. 73). Indeed some specificities of 
Unamuno’s creative praxis support Marías’ claim. His “nivolas” (“nivols” rather than “novels”) 
– a genre he invented which focuses on monologues and dialogues rather than on descriptions 
of time and space or on the development of a complex plot– aim to explore the psychology of 
the characters and unearth hidden aspects of the human experience. Nivolas are written without 
following a plan, and Unamuno seems to be much more interested in their cognitive content 
rather than in their aesthetic value.3 Applying this interpretative path inaugurated by Marías to 
the case of the emotions, Unamuno’s narrative fictions may be regarded as a means of obtaining 
knowledge about the affective life. More specifically, as I will propose, they can be regarded 
as sophisticated thought experiments about the intricacies of the human existence.  
 However, this interpretation of Unamuno´s writings as analogue to thought experiments 
requires the addition of two caveats. First, the focus of this paper on the cognitive aspects of 
his literature does not exclude that his narrative fiction has also aesthetic and moral value. 
Unamuno´s writings are aesthetically meritorious and they also manifest ethical attitudes, even 
though these will not be discussed here. Second, the notion of the “thought experiment” 
employed to explain the cognitive value of his writings can be interpreted in a strict sense or a 
metaphorical sense, leading to two different readings of his work. If we interpret the analogy in 
a strict sense, we might regard his writings as a way to prove specific hypotheses about human 
nature, and as arguments for or against certain philosophical positions. For instance, we can see 
Amor y Pedagogía as a way to argue via a reductio ad absurdum against the pedagogic ideas 
of the Pestalozzi school or against eugenics. From this perspective, literature would be a thought 
experiment in which variables would be selected in order to test specific hypotheses. It is also 
possible – as this paper will show – to interpret the analogy in a metaphorical sense.4 In this 
regard, Unamuno’s chief aim was not to write philosophical statements, nor was his intention 
to persuade the reader for or against a specific claim. In fact, his literature seeks not to provide 
strict rational argumentation, but rather to represent the possibilities inherent to the human 
being. Its cognitive value as a thought experiment thus consists in illuminating an aspect of life 
– and in doing so, offering the reader the possibility of engaging in a situation, which, despite 
being fictional, may both enlarge her experiential horizon and enrich her imaginative capacities. 
Literature presents us with experiences of life that are too rich, too subjective, and too complex 
to be reduced to a propositionally conceptualized form.5  
This metaphorical use of the concept of thought experiment is in accordance with 
Unamuno’s own understanding of literature as a form of philosophy. In his view, there are 
aspects of the human experience, to which the feelings belong, which are better understood 
through their vivid representation in novels, short narrations, and dramas, rather than through 
constructing complex philosophical systems. For Unamuno, reflection, introspection, and 
contemplation tend to disguise the phenomena we are trying to understand, and may easily lead 
to self-deception. Rational argument may lead us to overlook essential aspects of ourselves, 
misinterpret our feelings and desires, and falsely attribute to us traits we do not possess. In this 
regard, literature appears to Unamuno as the best way of doing philosophy, especially when 
dealing with questions regarding the self and the emotions.6 The complexities and anxieties of 
existence can be better approached from the perspective of feeling, a perspective that he sees 
as being intrinsically linked to literary praxis.  
This conception of philosophy as a form of literature places Unamuno within a long 
tradition of thinkers of “poetic reason”. For him, though, poetic reason is complementary to 
rational argument. The complementarity is to be thought of as a complementarity of two forms 
of reason and of doing philosophy, rather than as a complementarity of philosophy and 
literature.7 Unamuno regarded the variety of genres and styles he cultivated as forms of doing 
philosophy (in addition to novels, dramas, novellas, and short stories, he also wrote treatises, 
essays, memoirs, and articles). He felt free to employ different narrative devices as “methods” 
of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, behind the use of these different genres is also a question 
of communicability: they are seen as having different opportunities for reaching his public and 
engaging the readership.8 If his narrative fictions are to be understood as thought experiments, 
then it is not in the sense of them being a vehicle for philosophical claims or a tool with which 
to test a hypothesis, but rather as a complex device that helps us to both exercise our imagination 
in multiple ways, and enlarge our knowledge of ourselves. Against this background, our 
affectivity as a mode of existence appears as a main object of scrutiny.  
 
2. The “Man of Flesh and Bone” and the Emotions  
The relevance of affectivity as a key aspect of the human being is already set out in his major 
essay Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1913). The main idea behind this book is that we are 
“men of flesh and bone” and that our capacity to think and reason is tied up with our embodied 
existence: knowledge does not exist without feeling.9 Rather than an abstract entity, we are 
beings that suffer and feel, who are bound up with our historical, spatiotemporal environments, 
and who inhabit a social and cultural world. In this work, the human being is presented as one 
who yearns for immortality, yet whose hunger for eternal life conflicts with persistent 
ontological uncertainty as to what happens after death. This longing, this hope that our memory 
may be rescued from oblivion, is the source of many of our passions: it arises in forms of envy, 
jealousy, hatred, and herostratism (the desire to become acknowledged for morally wrong 
actions), as well as our capacity for artistic creativity, social recognition, procreation, and love. 
On the view presented here, all are the expression of our spiritual hunger for survival (TSL, pp. 
55–56).10  
The picture of affectivity developed in this 1913 essay is more radical than it seems. 
Emotion and reason are presented not as diametrically opposed, but rather as intimately 
intertwined. The rational dynamics inherent to emotion can be stated in at least four respects: 
1) First of all, Unamuno considers feelings to be a proof of our existence. The ontological 
insecurity and the consequent longing for immortality assail us in a way that leaves no room 
for doubting that we exist. In this regard, he proposes substituting the Cartesian cogito with a 
feeling being. 2) In addition, feelings give us information about ourselves and about the world, 
i.e. they inform us about our momentary state of being, and they direct us towards what we 
value. Thus, the anxiety provoked by the awareness of our finitude provides us with a very basic 
form of knowledge of the self (it indicates that our existence is marked by a preoccupation with 
our finitude), and it works as an indicator of the value we attribute to our life. 3) Unamuno 
identifies a fundamental form of feeling that is all-encompassing and that works as a 
determinant of our existence. This feeling is rooted in deeper strata of our self, and it is 
responsible for the world appearing to us in a certain light. He interprets this feeling as a “tragic 
sense of life”: a permanent preoccupation with our finitude. This anxiety concerning both our 
yearning for immortality and the uncertainty related to it constitutes, in his view, the most basic 
tenor of our existence. 4) Finally, according to Unamuno, our emotional life serves as a basis 
for both our cognitions (thoughts, judgments, beliefs, assumptions, etc.) and actions. The 
hunger for immortality may lead to wishful thinking, as when we believe ourselves capable of 
surviving death, or it may motivate actions of physical or spiritual immortality (procreation, 
herostratism, etc.). In each of these four regards, affectivity appears as a key feature of the 
human being, one which, following its own reasons, structures our engagement with the world. 
In Unamuno’s own words: “Reversing the terms of the adage nihil volitum quin preacognitum, 
I have told you that nihil cognitum quin preaevolitum, that we know nothing save what we have 
first, in one way or another, desired; and it may even be added that we can know nothing well 
save what we love, save what we pity” (TSL, p. 137).  
To understand the novelty of these views, we have to place them within two larger 
contexts. Historically, Unamuno’s claims were developed independently but in consonance 
with the phenomenological tradition, which at that time was advancing a new paradigm for 
understanding the emotions. I have in mind here not Heidegger, whose commonalities with 
Unamuno have been the object of several studies, but Max Scheler. Scheler was extremely 
influential in his time as a result of developing the phenomenological movement. It was 
Scheler’s view that: “Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans”. 11 In 
this claim, we can identify the primacy of affectivity over cognition and will, as well as the 
embedding of the emotions within the paradigm of rationality, two aspects that are also evident 
in Unamuno’s thinking. Nevertheless, a clear difference remains, for whereas Unamuno points 
to a “tragic sense of life” as a fundamental anxiety concerning human finitude – in a sense 
reminiscent of  Heidegger´s notion of “Angst” as a fundamental mood – Scheler underscores 
the function of love as the most fundamental aspect of our affectivity. Thus, unlike Unamuno 
and Heidegger, Scheler interprets the basic tenor of our existence as positive, as marked by love 
and openness, rather than as something troubling and threatening. The second context in which 
to locate Unamuno’s work is the contemporary philosophy of emotions. Seen from the current 
perspective, the novelty of Unamuno’s and the phenomenological accounts consists in 
explaining affectivity as a mode of being intentionally directed towards the world and 
disclosing its features. In other words, emotions are not merely felt qualities of our experience, 
but intentional states directed towards features of the world, which both provide information 
and help structure our engagement with reality. These claims prompted a paradigm shift in our 
understanding of affectivity, which remains dominant within the contemporary philosophy of 
mind. In this regard, one of the representative figures of the current debate, Peter Goldie, 
understands the emotions as a “feeling towards” concerning specific objects that involve a 
special way of thinking about the object of the emotion.12  
 Unamuno’s general views about affectivity as portrayed in his major essay reappears in 
fictionalized form in his literary writings where he was more concerned with specific emotional 
modes of existence. The main protagonists of his narrative fictions are lonely, conflicted, and 
self-divided figures, marked by the anxieties of existence, the longing for survival, and extreme 
forms of emotion. A brief overview of some of Unamuno’s writings is revealing in this regard. 
Amor y Pedagogía (1902) presents the reader with the topics of sham feelings, herostratism, 
self-deception, and the intricacies of love and desire. Hatred, envy, and jealousy, as well as 
combinations of these extremely negative emotions and their relation to love, are the main 
concern in Abel Sánchez (1917), La Tía Tula (1921), and El Otro (1926). Also in San Manuel, 
Bueno, Mártir (1931), the author explores the intricacies of love, self-deception, and self-image. 
These few examples suffice to give an idea about the importance of the emotions in Unamuno’s 
work. To flesh this out, in the next section, I will focus on one single emotion as developed in 
the novel Abel Sánchez: envy. I take this emotion to be representative of his philosophical 
thought, insofar as envy, among all other passions, reveals with utmost clarity the conflictual 
nature that holds between a person’s reality and her expectations or desires (between the 
ontological insecurity that marks human existence and the longing for immortality). Indeed, as 
Unamuno himself writes: “Envy is a thousand times more terrible than hunger, for it is spiritual 
hunger” (TSL, p. 55). 
  
3. Abel Sánchez: A Thought Experiment on Envy 
Abel Sánchez (1917) is a striking novel. It narrates the vicissitudes of the interwoven lives of 
two friends who have known each other since birth: Joaquín Monegro and Abel Sánchez. The 
industrious Joaquín studies medicine, while the creative Abel becomes a painter. Hidden behind 
this friendship, however, we find the story of a “sombre passion”: Joaquín envies Abel. Already 
as a child, he was envious of Abel’s talent, as well as the popularity and recognition he gained 
so effortlessly. This envy becomes even stronger when Abel marries Helena – Joaquín’s 
beautiful cousin with whom he was also in love – and becomes a famous painter. After his 
marriage with the devoted Antonia, Joaquín becomes father to Joaquina, but he feels envious 
of Abel because of his son, Abelín. Later on, Abelín will follow Joaquín’s path and become a 
doctor, marry his daughter, and give Abel and Joaquín a common grandson: Abelín. Abelín’s 
preference for Abel leads to a violent fight in which Joaquín grabs Abel who subsequently dies 
from a heart attack. At the end of his life, with the clear awareness of his enviousness, Joaquín 
writes his “Confessions” and dedicates them to his daughter.  
Already the naming of the protagonists evokes the myth of Cain (Joaquín) and Abel, 
and confronts the reader with the idea of fratricide. However, what Unamuno offers goes 
beyond the Old Testament myth. Rather than opposites, he presents both characters as 
complementary and mutually dependent, as Longhurst notes (UTN, p. 136). In addition, he 
inverts the relation between victim and tormentor: Joaquín appears to be the victim of Abel. At 
first sight, it may be surprising that the novel title takes the name of the envied protagonist 
(Abel), even though it is written from the view of the envious one (Joaquín). On closer 
inspection, however, this decision evinces the chief topic of the novel: Joaquín’s existential 
envy towards Abel. Abel is Joaquín’s obsession; in the idea of taking Abel’s place, Joaquín 
finds his own peculiar mode of survival. But given that this kind of “identity theft” is 
impossible, this leads him to suffer and to attempt, in vain, different strategies to overcome this 
passion.  
Abel Sánchez is a complex and rich novel, and is of course open to different readings 
and interpretations. In what follows, I will offer a philosophical reading according to which the 
novel might be interpreted as an insightful thought experiment (in the metaphorical sense stated 
above) about envy. Three main aspects will be examined: a) the ontology of envy and its relation 
to other nearby feelings; b) the phenomenology of envy and the world of its objects; and c) 
envy’s self-reflexivity.13  
   
a) The Ontology of Envy 
Abel Sánchez has an implicit ontology of envy, which is not found in the form of explicit 
theoretical statements. Rather it appears as vivid descriptions that challenge the reader to come 
to her own conclusions. The exploration of envy’s associated feelings and hybrid forms may 
serve as bases to discover its key features.    
As with the feeling of inferiority, in experiencing the sense of envy we feel somehow 
inferior to others. However, whereas the feeling of inferiority may lead to a range of positive 
and negative reactions – admiration of the other, shame towards her, sadness, resignation, etc. 
– in envy the reaction towards its object is entirely negative.  
A close neighbor of envy is the feeling of injustice. When as a result of our given 
circumstances (birth, social class, resources, etc.) we are at disadvantage, we feel unfairly 
treated by our destiny. Repeatedly, Joaquín’s complaints take the form of a feeling of injustice: 
“Why did they reject me? Why did they prefer the more frivolous one, the fickle one, the selfish 
one? All of them, all of them embittered my life. And I understood that the world is naturally 
unjust and that I had not been born among my own. It was my misfortune not to have been born 
among my own. I was destroyed by the baseness, cruelty and vulgarity of those around me”.14 
These reproaches, however, do not reveal a desire for a better world; rather, they disclose a 
desire for a world in which Joaquín occupies a privileged position. A similar self-oriented 
perspective may also be found in arrogance, an emotion that is often connected to envy. On 
some occasions, Joaquín experiences a hybrid the two: he is able to perceive Abel’s qualities 
and achievements only insofar as these features concern him. His explanation of Helena’s 
decision to marry Abel as her desire to torment and humiliate him in front of his rival should 
be interpreted in this sense: “It seemed to me that Helena had simply wanted to put me down, 
that she had kindled Abel’s love to spite me, that she was incapable, lump of flesh in a mirror 
that she was, of loving anybody” (AS, p. 47). 
Envy is also related to rivalry. Joaquín sees Abel as his rival. However, he is also aware 
that Abel enjoys an advantageous position: he already has what Joaquín so desires. In this 
context, envy exhibits strong commonalities with jealousy. In both states, the subject judges her 
own value in relation to the target. However, whereas the envier’s attention is focused on the 
person who possesses what she desires, with this person forming at the same time the object of 
comparison: in jealousy the object of attention is the person who the jealous one wants to 
possess, but the object of comparison is the one who plays the role of the rival. Hybrid forms 
entailing both emotions are common. Joaquín’s jealousy towards Abel after he marries Helena 
fuels his hatred and works as a trigger of his envy. But he is not always jealous of Abel on 
account of Helena; at times he envies Abel without Helena playing a role.  
Revenge, “Schadenfreude”, contempt and Ressentiment are also in the same 
neighborhood as envy. Revenge aims to re-establish a hypothetical objective order, which, in 
the eyes of the envier, has been damaged by the envied person. This impulse is the expression 
of envy’s inherent destructive intention. In this regard, “Schadenfreude” as the experience of 
joy in learning of the troubles of another may play an interesting function: when something bad 
happens to the envied unexpectedly, the envier feels that some sort of cosmic justice has been 
performed.15 Envy may also lead one to focus on the negative traits of the other and foster 
contempt. This focus on negative features of the target, however, may be motivated after a 
process of obfuscation for positive values and an inversion of positive features into negative 
ones has taken place. When this happens, “Ressentiment”, as the emotional attitude that leads 
to devaluate what one cannot achieve, may be at play. This strategy to deal with the feelings of 
inferiority and impotence has nothing to do with the emotion of resentment which arises when 
an injustice is perceived. The intertwinement of envy, contempt, and “Ressentiment” is at work 
in Joaquín: sometimes his envy towards Abel unfolds into contempt towards him and Helena; 
while at other times, full of “Ressentiment”, he interprets Abel’s positive features as having a 
negative value. Both moves are strategies to diminish the excruciating pain produced by his 
repeated episodes of envy. The differences between the three emotional complexes remain: in 
envy, we are aware of the positive features of the other of which we are desirous; in contempt, 
we focus on her faults; while in “Ressentiment”, an inversion of values has taken place, 
meaning that positive features are interpreted as lacking value.16 
Hatred is often another key ingredient of envy. It gives envy its corrosive energy. 
Nevertheless, while in hatred we are convinced that our object is morally bad, in envy we 
remain aware of its positive values. Joaquín’s existential envy towards Abel is strongly marked 
by his hatred. Thus, it has its roots in the deepest levels of his personality and it functions as a 
formative element of the self.  
 As a result of these variations in the imagination enabled by the novel, envy is presented 
as a whole (or Gestalt, rather than a basic emotion) that emerges when different affective (1), 
cognitive (2), and volitional (3) experiences appear interrelated in a unique way. (1) In envy 
other emotions such as jealousy, rivalry, contempt, Ressentiment, and hatred appear as 
ingredients, even though envy cannot be reduced to any one of them in isolation. It also implies 
the painful feeling of being unfairly treated by others and by fate, and a feeling of powerlessness 
to change the situation. (2) Envy presupposes we are aware of the value of the other and that an 
evaluation of one’s own value in comparison to that of others takes place. And (3) it motivates 
the symbolic or real destruction of the other, in addition to actions that may lead to the 
restoration of a desired order, in which we no longer feel inferior and powerless.  
 
b) Phenomenology and Object of Envy 
The vicarious experience of envy that one undergoes when reading the novel enables a focus 
on two essential aspects of any emotion: its qualitative feel, i.e. the way it is 
phenomenologically experienced; and the world of the objects towards which envy is 
intentionally directed.17 
To develop the first aspect, attention to an acute episode of envy is necessary. After 
discovering that Helena will marry Abel, Joaquín writes: “in the days following the one on 
which he told me that they were getting married […] I felt as if my whole soul were freezing 
over. An icy coldness ate into my heart. I felt like flames made of ice. I had difficulty breathing. 
My hatred for Helena and above all for Abel, because it was really hatred, a cold hatred whose 
roots reached down into my soul, had become hard as rock. […] It was as if my soul had become 
totally frozen within that hatred” (AS, p. 53). A threefold perspective on the experience of envy 
is offered in this passage. 1) In virtue of its intrinsic quality, envy is an extremely unpleasant 
emotion. Joaquín describes a narrowing in his chest, which is painfully experienced as being 
restrained. According to his description, envy is felt as “flames made of ice”, i.e. it is a 
combination of warmness (as in anger) and coldness (as in sadness). To describe its mixed form, 
Unamuno makes use of the vocabulary of the senses. This can be regarded as a literary resource 
to help grasp the complexity of the phenomenon in question, but it might be also an indicator 
that our language is not rich enough to capture the nuances of our emotional experiences with 
single terms. 2) As far as the mode of givenness is concerned, envy may be experienced as an 
acute episode (as in the passage above), but it is also possible that this emotion becomes an 
enduring disposition in reaction to specific objects. In this last case, envy is an all-encompassing 
mode of existence, it resembles a character trait and it becomes part of our personality. 3) 
Finally, envy’s corrosive and destructive energy determines an inner attitude of disapproval and 
separation between subject and object. Its implicit action tendencies are marked by the 
annihilation of its target, which may be either real or merely symbolic (Elster, p. 246). Joaquín’s 
first thought after seeing the ill Abel is: “And what if he were to die?” (AS, p. 59). This 
destructive tendency may affect not only the target but also all that is related to him. Thus, when 
Joaquín refuses to help at the birth of Abel’s son, his refusal is motivated by the fear to 
strangulate the newborn. In the face of all of these different forms of negativity, it is not 
surprising that the envier will experiment with different strategies in the hope of overcoming 
such passion. 
Regarding the intentional objects of envy, a distinction between formal and material 
objects is necessary.18 At the formal level, envy is directed towards things that matter to us, 
things that are important to us and that we value. Envy is, therefore, intentionally directed 
towards things we deem to be good. At the material level, envy is directed towards personal 
entities, and it presupposes a net of beliefs. To begin with, we must be able to identify a 
significant other (1). The person with whom we identify must be similar and familiar to us, and 
they must be close enough to foster a comparison. On the one hand, we do not compare 
ourselves with those who are socially, culturally, emotionally, etc. too distant from us, but rather 
with those who we feel belong to a same or at least similar group. On the other hand, we do not 
envy those with whom we feel in unity: we feel joy towards their achievements, but not envy. 
Envy is directed towards another who is close enough to be member of an in-group, but distant 
enough for us not to share in their achievements as if they were our own. Following the 
identification of a significant other, a comparison with salient aspects of the other is necessary 
for envy (2). In principle, there is nothing odd about comparing our value to that of others. The 
aim of making comparisons is often to acquire a degree of self-knowledge: becoming aware of 
who we are. We try to be realistic in our comparison, and so we compare ourselves with others 
who are similar to us and with whom we may identify.19 The problem begins, however, when, 
during this comparison, we feel at a disadvantage and inferior to the other. A third necessary 
condition for envy is the belief in one’s own inferiority (3). This condition is not suficient on 
its own, for this belief may alsogive rise to resignation or sadness. A further belief for envy is 
required: we believe that we also deserve the desired good in question. This belief in the 
unfairness of the situation leads us to think that we should also have the oportunity enjoyed by 
the other (4). Another condition can be identified in the judgment that we are powerless to 
change the situation (5). Finally, for in envy we consider it a burden that the other is the one 
who possesses what we desire, and we want to change places with them (6).20 This complex 
network of cognitions is involved in Joaquín’s existential envy: Joaquín compares himself with 
Abel. Both are the same age and share a common background. Abel is relevant to Joaquín’s 
self-evaluation. In this comparison Joaquín discovers that Abel is closer than himself to his 
ideal self. Joaquín thinks that he is a victim of an unfair situation, feels powerless to change the 
situation, and experiences Abel’s existence as a burden. 
 
c) The Self and the Sense of Possibility in Envy 
As the judgmental structure of envy shows, this emotion includes a twofold reference to the 
self. On the one hand, as has been emphasized, envy is an emotion of social comparison: a 
plurality of selves is necessary for envy to take place. It includes a social comparison, which 
takes another self as its object. On the other hand, envy entails a moment of self-reflexivity in 
which aspects of the self are revealed to oneself as painful (one’s own inferiority, the failure to 
achieve one’s desired goals, etc.). This self-reflexive moment, which has received much less 
attention in the literature on envy, will be the object of analysis in this section.  
Throughout the novel, Joaquín is concerned about his own envious personality. 
Discussing Lord Byron’s Cain he sketches four possible answers to the question as to why was 
he an envier: 1) Cain was created by God as an envier; 2) God is responsible for the unfair 
differences between Cain and Abel; 3) God showed his preference for Abel; 4) Abel triggered 
Cain’s envy by boasting that he was God’s favorite. With regard to the first three motives, Cain 
(and Joaquín) is a victim of God’s injustice. The last motive presents Cain (and Joaquín) as 
Abel’s victim, in this sense inverting their respective roles.21 Joaquín thinks he is predestined 
to envy, and this gives rise to a paralysis of action and weakness of the will, to the extent that 
he cannot control his feelings. 
These four motives present Joaquín as a victim of others (God, Abel) and as predestined 
to be an envier. However, on closer inspection, the novel offers a different reading according 
to which, far from being a predetermined character trait, envy is actually linked to the sense of 
possibility. Unamuno presents human existence as much more determined by its possibilities 
than by its factual reality.22 Envy is only possible because certain possibilities inherent to 
ourselves go unrealized. The idea that we could have become a different person, that we could 
have developed different qualities, lived different lives, and achieved different goals can lead 
to suffering, anxiety, and negative feelings of all kinds, including envy. The other to whom we 
compare ourselves reminds us of our lost or unfulfilled possibilities, and we suffer as a result 
of this. From this perspective, the other is not just the object of our envy, but it is used as a 
trigger to feel the gap between our real self and our desired self which incarnates our unrealized 
expectations. 
Related to this idea of unfulfilled possibilities at the core of envy, this emotion also has 
an existential dimension. As presented in Unamuno’s work, envy (and emotion in general) is 
not just a mental episode, but a mode of existence. Joaquín’s existential envy neatly exemplifies 
this aspect. Unamuno himself, in the prologue to the second edition of the novel (1928), 
describes Joaquín’s envy as “angelic”, and as such differing from all vulgar forms of this 
emotion: his envy is derived from ontological insecurity and the search for a stable ground that 
cannot be found in oneself. This envy is directed towards the entire existence of the other, and 
it is so powerful that it is a constituent part of our personality.23 Joaquín envies Abel’s existence 
as a whole, not just an individual aspect of him (his talent, popularity, or his wife). His envy is 
rooted in the deepest level of his self and constitutes the affective background of his existence. 
Thus, he writes: “[…] for in his solitude he never managed to be alone, for the other was always 
there. The other! It got to the point where he suddenly found himself in dialogue with him, 
inventing what the other one said to him. And the other, in these solitary dialogues, in these 
dialogued monologues, said inconsequential and agreeable things to him, and never showed 
him any rancor. ‘My God, why does he not hate me!’, he came to ask himself” (AS, p. 135). 
Instead of a cultivation of the self, Joaquín appeases his hunger for immortality with the desire 
to become the envied other. The possibility of being Abel consumes Joaquín’s life much more 
than the reality of his own being.  
If Joaquín became an envier, this is not because he was destined to become so. The 
weakness of his will is not a question of fate, but one of self-esteem. Despite being an 
unpleasant, discomforting, destabilizing feeling, Joaquín’s envy survives all attempts to 
transform it into embitterment, resignation, frustration, or even admiration. His self-hatred 
prevents him from controlling his passion and leads him to feel unloved and unworthy of love, 
as well as being incapable of loving others. It is this self-hatred that blocks any form of love 
and prevents him from living his life. Lucidly, on his deathbed, Joaquín exclaims to his wife: 
“If I had loved you that would have cured me. But I didn’t love you and now it grieves me not 
to have loved you. If only we could start again” (AS, p. 221). Love would have opened him up 
to new possibilities and new ways of fully becoming an autonomous human being.  
 
4. Knowledge about the Emotions 
If Unamuno’s narrative fictions may be considered as a kind of “thought experiment” in order 
to present and understand the intricacies of the human heart, then the question arises as to what 
kind of knowledge is conveyed by his literary writings. I will contend that, at least in three 
regards, we may obtain propositional and non-propositional knowledge about the emotions by 
reading Unamuno’s novels. Attention will be paid to the enlargement of our capacities for the 
conceptualization and description, perception, and transformation of our emotional 
experiences.24 These three forms are not exhaustive but rather representative of his 
understanding of philosophy as literature. My focus will be the novel analyzed above, but my 
conclusions may be applied to all of Unamuno’s literary output.  
1) Conceptualization and description: First, narrative fictions offer conceptual and 
linguistic devices for the description of emotional experience. Envy is a complex phenomenon, 
a mode of existence that emerges from a unique combination of affective, cognitive, and 
volitional phenomena. As experience it may be too rich to be grasped in ordinary life, and we 
may lack the appropriate conceptual and linguistic devices for its description. Against this 
background, literature offers us the chance to conceptualize these emotional complexes and 
processes, while also providing a new vocabulary with which to express them. Focusing on the 
concrete case of Abel Sánchez, this novel presents us with the idea of an “existential envy”, and 
it presents a linguistic description of its ontology, its bodily phenomenology, the world of its 
objects, and its self-reflexive moments. We learn to conceptualize and to linguistically express 
specific emotions, their nuances, and their hybrid forms.  
2) Perception: A refinement of our perceptive abilities for certain emotions, emotional 
complexes, and features is also possible. Rather than presenting a theory of envy in the form of 
claims and arguments for and against them, Unamuno presents an ultimate form of envy. He 
exposes the reader to an extreme form of the emotion, such that we would be unlikely to 
experience in everyday life. In addition, this exposition does not take place from a detached 
perspective; rather, the author involves the reader in a first-person perspective (Joaquín’s 
confessions afford us such an internal point of view). In this way, certain aspects of envy 
become more salient and visible, which leads to a refinement of the reader’s awareness of this 
emotion.   
3) Transformation: Literature may also lead to a change in our emotional life. In reacting 
emotionally to the depicted circumstances, in becoming viscerally involved in the narrative, 
and in mobilizing our own repertoire of lived experiences so as to understand the fictional 
universe, we are touched by the narrative. Even if we are not in a similarly envious state like 
Joaquín, we are nevertheless able to imagine, re-present, and understand his vital circumstances, 
reconstructing the scenarios depicted, with reference to our own experiences, step by step. We 
may also refuse to imagine, feel, or believe what is portrayed in the novel. In any case, we are 
confronted with ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that may lead to a transformation in 
ourselves. We may become aware of new aspects of our own emotional lives, or we might be 
prompted to reconsider aspects already known, yet from a new perspective.  
This cultivation of our emotional capacities also has a moral dimension. As such, for 
Unamuno, the feeling of uncertainty, which determines the tragic sense of life and the inward 
struggle, serves “as the basis for action and morals” (TSL, p. 128). Thus, any change in our 
emotive capacities will have repercussions in our moral life. Not in the sense that he persuades 
us of moral maxims to follow, but in pushing us to perceive, judge, and feel in ways hitherto 
unimagined and in arriving at our own conclusions.25 In presenting the complexity of human 
experience embedded in specific situations, Unamuno is also interested in moving us ethically, 
sharpening our capacities to perceive moral values, and cultivating our capacity for moral 
judgment. 
To conclude, Unamuno’s interest in exploring human nature not only encompasses all 
his literary and non-literary work; it also amalgamates all of the other key themes of his 
philosophy of existence, identity, finitude, personality, and freedom. Besides his treatise Del 
sentimiento trágico de la vida, his philosophy of the emotions is primarily developed in his 
fictional works. As thought experiments, Unamuno’s fiction enlarges our knowledge not by 
being the vehicle for various propositions and claims. Rather, they most primarily confront the 
reader with unsuspected facets of the human being, present us with aspects of ourselves that are 
often overlooked or disguised, and alter our perception and judgment about the world of human 
experience in interesting and fruitful ways.  
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